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Introduction 
On 24 April 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) first reported the emergence of a 
new Influenza virus in the United States of America and Mexico (1). This novel Influenza vi-
rus was identified as a new subtype A(H1N1) resulting from a reassortment of avian, human 
and swine Influenza viruses. This virus, which was later on referred to as A(H1N1)2009, rap-
idly demonstrated its capacity to transmit among humans (2). On 11 June 2009, the WHO 
decided to raise the pandemic alert phase to its maximum level (phase 6) (3).  
Influenza in humans is caused by one of three types of influenza viruses A, B and rarely C, 
which all belong to the orthomyxoviridae family, and have two glycoproteins on the surface of 
the virions, the hemagglutinin (HA) and the neuraminidase (NA). These proteins elicit anti-
body responses to the Influenza virus, and so far sixteen different HAs (H1 to H16) and 9 
different NAs (N1 to N9) have been recognised. Several combinations of HA and NA proteins 
are possible, each combination representing a different subtype (for example A/H1N1, 
A/H3N2, A/H1N2 …). An important characteristic of Influenza viruses is their ability to evolve 
continuously to escape the immune response. The mechanisms behind this evolution are 
either antigenic drift (point mutations in the HA and NA genes) or antigenic shift (reassort-
ment between different Influenza viruses). 
For a virus to cause a pandemic, two major criteria must be met: the virus must be novel (an-
tigenic shift), as this means that a large proportion of the population is susceptible to 
infection, and the virus must be transmissible from person to person (4, 5). In this context, 
the initial reporting of this novel transmissible Influenza variant to the WHO and the continu-
ous surveillance of this virus is of the highest importance and allows to monitor virus 
evolution and reduce the public health risk for the population worldwide (6). 
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In Belgium, the surveillance is ensured by the National Centre for Influenza (NIC) (www.wiv-
isp.be/flu). According to the WHO (7, 8), the responsibilities of the NIC during the pandemic 
period are: 1) to provide laboratory diagnosis for monitoring the geographical spread of the 
pandemic in the country; 2) as the pandemic intensifies and becomes widespread, to adjust 
virological surveillance in order to monitor the progress of the pandemic in the country; 3) to 
maintain adequate virological surveillance to assist WHO in monitoring for example antigenic 
and genetic changes in the pandemic virus, pathogenicity, and antiviral susceptibility.  
Methods 
Sampling in the containment phase 
From 26 April to 13 July 2009, a containment phase was implemented according to the WHO 
and CDC recommendations, in order to limit the extension of the epidemic (9). The Intermin-
isterial Influenza Coordination Committee established a series of measures and protocols to 
manage all suspect cases and contacts regarding notification, sampling, prophylaxis, treat-
ment and isolation (10). An active surveillance system was then established, in order to 
detect all suspect cases of A(H1N1)2009 and to trace their contacts. Physicians, in collabo-
ration with the communities’ health inspectors, were asked to take a sample from each 
patient showing flu symptoms and returning from infected countries or regions. Due to the 
rapid geographic extension of the pandemic, the list of such countries was updated regularly. 
During this period, more than 3000 sampling kits were sent to physicians, laboratories and 
hospitals all around Belgium and additional kits were provided on request. These kits each 
contained 4 swabs, transport medium, FFP2 masks, an information form and a detailed 
sampling procedure to take respiratory secretions from nose and throat. Samples needed to 
be sent to the NIC on the same day, in order to give a diagnostic result within 5-6 hours. The 
laboratory was operational 24/24 hours, 7/7 days, in collaboration with all involved public 
health authorities.  
Sampling in the mitigation phase 
From 13 July 2009 onwards, because of the sustained community spread, Belgium’s strategy 
shifted to mitigation (week 29 to recent), where no systematic laboratory confirmation testing 
was requested anymore. Only high risk and hospitalised patients were to be tested for 
A(H1N1)2009 if suspected. 
In addition, during this phase, the NIC strengthened the nationwide surveillance system to 
study the A(H1N1)2009 virus circulation in the Belgian population and to help reduce influ-
enza morbidity and mortality. Therefore the influenza virological sentinel surveillance 
network, previously composed of 98 general practitioners (GPs) distributed in the whole 
country (11), was expanded to 139 GPs (78 GPs located in Flanders, 49 in Wallonia and 12 
in the Brussels-Capital Region) (Figure 1). These GPs were all part of the Sentinel GP Net-
work composed of approximately 160 GPs, who are also involved in the clinical influenza 
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surveillance (11). The decision to enlarge the virological sentinel surveillance network was 
taken when the first three positive A(H1N1)2009 cases in Belgium were diagnosed by this 
network during week 27. 
Figure 1: Geographical distribution (N) by district of the GPs involved  
in the influenza virological sentinel surveillance in Belgium 
Laboratory testing 
At the start of the pandemic, there was still a lack of information about the pathogenicity and 
transmission of the virus. Therefore, and to avoid any possible reassortment between strains 
from swine and human origins, manipulation and RNA extraction of the suspect specimens 
were performed in biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facilities instead of BSL2 where similar samples 
are tested yearly within the framework of monitoring seasonal flu. Viral RNA from clinical 
samples was extracted in duplicate with the QIAamp® Viral RNA Kit from QIAGEN (Hilden, 
Germany).  
The extracted RNA was then submitted to a series of real-time PCR tests in a BSL2 envi-
ronment. The real-time PCR reactions were performed in a Stratagene Mx3000P™ thermal 
cycler using the SuperScript® III Platinum® One-Step qRT-PCR System from Invitrogen 
(Carlsbad, California, USA). At first, there was no specific test available for the new pan-
demic influenza virus. Therefore the suspect samples were tested for influenza A and B, and 
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subtyped for seasonal influenza A/H1 and A/H3. Primers and probes for each type (A/B) and 
subtype (H1/H3) were designed in a conserved gene region, selected either from the litera-
ture or after multiple-sequence alignment with a large amount of recent human and animal 
strains available at GenBank. Regions of the matrix gene (12) and of the Hemagglutinin gene 
(13) were amplified for typing A and B respectively. For subtyping, a region in the HA gene 
was amplified. A sample which was positive for influenza A and negative for both seasonal 
subtypes (H1N1 and H3N2) was considered as a probable case. 
From 3 May 2009, specific primers and probes for A(H1N1)2009 virus were sent by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of Atlanta (14) and used as standard tests in 
our laboratory. The workflow of the tests is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Workflow of laboratory tests in case of influenza A(H1N1)2009 suspicion in a patient 
 
A series of randomly selected samples from the start, the peak and the end of the pandemic, 
as well as samples from more severely affected patients, were also sequenced, in order to 
detect any mutations in the hemagglutinin or neuraminidase gene, including mutations asso-
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ciated with resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors. A selection of approximately 200 samples 
was also sent to London (WHO Collaborating Centre) for antigenic characterisation and 
monitoring of antiviral resistance.  
Results 
On 12 May 2009, the NIC confirmed the first case of influenza A(H1N1)2009 in a patient re-
turning from the United States. In total, 614 patient samples were tested during the 
containment phase (week 18 to 28) in Belgium, of which 125 cases were confirmed positive 
for A(H1N1)2009, the majority being imported cases. One sample out of the 614 analysed 
samples was positive for influenza B, 14 samples were confirmed to be A/H3N2 positive and 
13 others were found to be positive for influenza A but could not be subtyped. This could be 
due to the lower sensitivity of the PCR test for subtyping H1 in comparison with the PCR for 
typing A or due to the evolution of the virus causing mismatches with the primers or probes.  
During the mitigation phase, 729 additional suspect cases were tested, with 285 confirmed 
cases for A(H1N1)2009, 3 cases positive for influenza A/H3N2 and 47 cases positive for in-
fluenza A which could not be subtyped for similar reasons as mentioned above.  
Figure 3: Weekly evolution of the number of analysed samples and influenza A positive samples  
from week 2009-18 until week 2009-52 in the non-sentinel network 
Figure 3 shows the weekly evolution of the number of analysed samples and the number of 
confirmed A(H1N1)2009 or A/H3N2 cases in the non-sentinel network. In the first phase of 
the pandemic, a high number of suspected samples received from physicians, laboratories 
and hospitals all around Belgium was analysed but did not necessarily reveal a high number 
of A(H1N1)2009 confirmed cases in relation to the total number of analysed samples. This is 
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A(H1N1)2009 at that time, the high media attention to the flu crisis, the subsequent psycho-
logical impact on the population and also the first people returning form holidays in countries 
where the novel influenza strain was already detected. A second peak in the number of ana-
lysed samples was observed in week 46, which coincides more or less with the epidemic 
peak, characterised by a high percentage of confirmed A(H1N1)2009 cases. A low number of 
influenza A/H3N2 could still be detected until week 34, which might correspond to the end of 
the seasonal influenza epidemic 2008-2009 which was characterised by a high prevalence of 
the A/H3N2 subtype. In week 21, an increase in the percentage of A(H1N1)2009 positive 
samples was observed, resulting from a higher number of confirmation tests (samples al-
ready tested positive for influenza A but still not subtyped by other laboratories) at this stage 
of the epidemic. 
Figure 4 shows the weekly evolution of the number of analysed samples and of influenza 
A(H1N1)2009 positive samples in the sentinel network. In Belgium, the proportion of positive 
samples increased from 28% in week 40 to 73% in week 44 (corresponding to the epidemic 
peak) (11). The proportion then decreased slowly from week 46 (51%) to week 52 (25%). 
From week 43 to week 44, the graph shows a drastic decrease in the number of analysed 
samples. This is the result of a change in the sampling strategy. Until that time, GPs were 
asked to take a sample from each patient who presented with influenza-like illness (ILI) 
symptoms. But from then on, they were asked to take maximum 2 samples a week, in order 
to decrease the number of analyses. Still, until week 50, the epidemiological criteria were re-
spected: the rate of doctor visits was still above the epidemic threshold (established at 141 
doctor visits per 100,000 inhabitants) and among patients with ILIs, more than 20% people 
were found positive for influenza A(H1N1)2009 (Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Weekly evolution of the number of analysed samples and influenza A positive samples  
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The genetic and antigenic analysis of a series of A(H1N1)2009 strains isolated in Belgium 
revealed no significant difference with pandemic strains found worldwide. All strains corre-
spond to the reference strain A/California/4/09. Out of the 48 samples analysed by the WHO 
Collaborating Centre, one strain isolated from an immunosuppressed patient showed resis-
tance to Oseltamivir (neuraminidase inhibitor). In this patient, the mutation H275Y was 
observed in the neuraminidase gene. 
Conclusions 
The introduction of the Influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus in Belgium occurred in a similar manner 
as in other European countries, initially causing a small but rapidly increasing number of 
cases (10). In this emergency context, the laboratory optimised a battery of real-time RT-
PCR assays to be able to perform diagnosis within one day. The aim was to identify the posi-
tive cases as soon as possible and to limit the propagation of the virus in the Belgian 
population. The surveillance system worked in accordance with the NIC public health mis-
sion, demonstrating an effective collaboration between the different partners and national 
authorities. Until the end of 2009, the pandemic appeared to be less severe than initially pre-
dicted, with less serious symptoms and a limited number of lethal cases. Finally its evolution 
seems to be more comparable with that of a classical seasonal epidemic. Genotypically, the 
pandemic influenza strains isolated in Belgium up to now correspond to those isolated 
worldwide.  
Nevertheless, future evolution of the A(H1N1)2009 virus remains uncertain, even if this pan-
demic virus will probably circulate for the next seasons. Continuous efforts must be made to 
update the molecular diagnostic methods to follow the high genetic variability of influenza 
viruses and to highlight potential resistance against antivirals. Therefore a close and sus-
tained monitoring of the evolution of the virus is required to provide an adequate response 
and surveillance system in the near future.  
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